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Creating a Market-Driven Organization
Abstract
As companies aspire to become market-driven, they exhort employees to get closer to customers, stay ahead
of competitors, and make decisions based on their markets. Yet, even the best-intentioned senior managers
find it difficult to translate those aspirations into action. Failed or flawed change programs have many
symptoms, most of which are traceable to a lack of commitment to the deep-seated changes needed. The
organization hasn't fully grasped what it means to be market-driven — or why it matters — and lacks a clear
path to that end.1 Further problems occur if the change program is unsuited to the task of orienting the
business to its present and prospective markets.
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As companies aspire to become market-
driven, they exhort employees to get clos-
er to customers, stay ahead of competitors,
and make decisions based on their mar-
kets. Yet, even the best-intentioned senior
managers find it difficult to translate those
aspirations into action. Failed or flawed
change programs have many symptoms,
most of which are traceable to a lack of
commitment to the deep-seated changes
needed. The organization hasn’t fully
grasped what it means to be market-
driven — or why it matters — and lacks a
clear path to that end.1 Further problems
occur if the change program is unsuited
to the task of orienting the business to its
present and prospective markets.
While the underlying principles and pre-
scription of generic change programs
offer valuable guidance, the organization
must sensitively tailor the design of a
change program to become market-driven
to the particular challenges of understand-
ing, attracting, and keeping valuable cus-
tomers. My purpose in this article is to
establish the six conditions that ensure
change process success. I use the experi-
ences of four different change programs
— Fidelity Investments, Sears Roebuck,
Eurotunnel, and Owens Corning — and
post-audits of some failed change initia-
tives to validate the change model and
explain the necessary conditions for a
durable shift to a market orientation.
A firm’s orientation to its present and prospective
markets is subject to two pressures. On one side are
the centripetal influences that induce the company to
look inward for guidance on decisions and become
remote from customers and unresponsive to competi-
tive challenges. This influence is accentuated by a
“liability of success” where good financial performance
leads to arrogance, overconfidence, and a technology
orientation that condones the belief that “we know bet-
ter than the market.” Compounding the problems are
the centrifugal effects of market, technology, and
competitive change that continually pull the business
out of alignment with its markets and erode its advan-
tages. The interplay of these forces leads to one or
more of the following triggers for change:
• Market disruptions that threaten the business model.
• Continuing erosion of alignment with the market
that puts the firm at a disadvantage with market-
driven competitors.
• Strategic necessity.
• Intolerable opportunity costs.
Each of these triggers started at least one of the four
change programs described in this article.
Market Disruptions
When managers at Fidelity Investments scanned the
retail investment landscape in 1993, they saw a host
of new or energized competitors, including discount
brokers, banks, and insurance companies, the emer-
gence of independent financial advisers offering un-
biased, comprehensive advice, and customers who
were concentrating their investments with fewer
firms.2 Fidelity was not a full-range provider of invest-
ment vehicles, nor did it have the low-cost advantage
of Schwab or Vanguard with a stable of index funds,
lean organization, and frugal culture.
Fidelity’s pressing need was to cement and extend its
relationships with the most valuable prospects in its
large customer base by offering a value proposition
that product-focused competitors couldn’t match. It
could accomplish this by providing credible advice
tailored to the situation. The theory was compelling
but the reality was that the organization was geared
to providing standard service to everyone, and the
systems couldn’t identify which accounts were prof-
itable and worth pursuing. The prevailing culture,
structure, rewards, and measurements were all at
odds with the strategy aspirations.
The change program proceeded on four fronts at the
same time. This meant simultaneously picking the
customer segments to nurture while building the sys-
tems infrastructure so Fidelity could identify and
serve these attractive segments, and redesigning core
processes for customer acquisition, retention, and
optimization. The most difficult part was persuading
the prevailing culture to accept a market-driven strat-
egy of differentiated service. The inevitable resistance
was overcome with organizational changes that
moved accountability to segment managers, and mea-
surements and rewards based on profitability, reten-
tion, and share of wallet.
Erosion of Market Alignment
Sears Roebuck is a classic case of what happens
when a firm loses touch with its markets.3 Until 1986,
Sears was the dominant retailer in the United States,
with a strategy fully in harmony with the changing
requirements of suburban homeowners. By 1992, it
was struggling to absorb a $3.9 billion loss and over-
come a declining market share, bloated costs, and
some of the worst customer satisfaction ratings in the
retail industry. Customers were being rapidly
siphoned off by trendy specialty retailers such as The
Limited, category killers like Home Depot, or dis-
counters like Wal-Mart and Target.
Arthur Martinez, who had been vice chairman of Saks
Fifth Avenue and was the first outsider to head the
retail group, led the turnaround. Within 100 days of
his arrival, he and his team began to plan for the
closing of 113 unprofitable stores, the termination of
the 100-year-old Sears catalogue, and the divestment
of the financial-services business. The quick-fix
worked, but the real challenge was to turn a short-
term survival program into a long-term transformation
that fully engaged employees who were dispirited
and anxious for improved performance. They needed
to be motivated to support a new merchandising
focus. Although the prevailing assumption was that
Sears was a men’s store, women made a majority of





What Triggers the Change Process?
The real challenge was to turn a 
short-term survival program into 
a long-term transformation that fully
engaged employees.
“the softer side of Sears” and introduced new private-
label lines of apparel and cosmetics, summed up the
challenge: “A turnaround is a financial recovery. A
transformation is much more. It’s all about changing
the structure and the approach to the business and
reeducating our people to feel comfortable outside a
command-and-control environment.”4
Strategic Necessity
Eurotunnel began with the single objective of build-
ing a tunnel under the English Channel. When it
completed construction, it had to transform itself
from a project organization to an operating company
with its own rolling stock for transporting trucks and
cars through the tunnel. A change in culture wouldn’t
suffice; it needed a complete reversal. The entire
company had to transform from spending whatever it
took to finish the tunnel to controlling costs and
earning money. It had to become efficient to attract,
serve, and retain customers that could compete
against the established ferries and airline services. A
sense of urgency developed as Eurotunnel projected
huge and unacceptable losses if it didn’t make big
cuts to its bloated cost structure. However, the
change process focused on growing revenues, as the
company judged this to be an energizing goal that
would overcome early suspicions that the process
was merely a cost-cutting exercise.
The first step was to organize around customers and
processes and jettison the old functional structure.
The company devised separate teams and strategies
for the truck, rail, and tourist travel segments. A team
with strong support at the top guided the overall
change and in turn created a complex change archi-
tecture that involved more than 1,000 people in
eighty-five different cross-functional teams. Priorities
for teams dealing with everything from timetable
planning to introducing a club-class service were
guided by customer inputs.5
Intolerable Opportunity Costs
When Glen Hiner left General Electric in 1991 to join
Owens Corning, manufacturer of fiberglass insulation,
glass composites, and roofing materials, the company
was mired in debt, besieged by asbestos litigation,
and suffering from a bunker mentality.6 Owens
Corning managers had a product orientation that
made sense, given the realities of a business with
cyclical sales and a capital-intensive process for mak-
ing fiberglass that was cost effective only when it ran
continuously at high speed.
While the company focused on its materials, its cus-
tomers were thinking about their projects. Home
improvers had problems with unreliable contractors,
scant information, and unforeseen problems. The
materials were secondary, and the customers couldn’t
distinguish among brands anyway. Builders and con-
tractors, frustrated when materials they needed were
late, also thought in project terms. Meanwhile, the
greatest needs of retailers like Home Depot were
sophisticated logistics and help in training salespeople.
Owens Corning recognized that the compelling value
proposition of offering one-stop shopping and solu-
tions to problems posed by projects was well beyond
its capabilities. There were big gaps in its product
line, and the balkanized sales and service organiza-
tion couldn’t offer a simple way for customers to buy
a complete portfolio of products. The company had
to overcome serious information bottlenecks and
rethink how information flowed through it and to
and from its customers.
Designing the Change Program
What do the experiences of Fidelity Investments,
Sears Roebuck, Eurotunnel, and Owens Corning
have in common? Each had to change to get closer to
its market and satisfy and retain customers or face
dire consequences. None used an off-the-shelf pack-
age; each tailored a change program to fit its her-
itage, market strategy, and leadership personality. Yet
each change program had some features in common
with other successful initiatives.
First, the entire organization from top to bottom was
involved. This multifunctional boundary-spanning
effort could not be left to a part-time task force or
given to the human resources or marketing depart-
ments. Their roles are supportive, not dominant. 
Second, the focus was on the conditions enabling
people to produce good results — not on the charac-
teristics of the change leaders. Thus Fidelity initially
emphasized the clarity of its strategy in terms of seg-
ments and value propositions and the adequacy of
the customer database and front-end systems as nec-
essary conditions to process and organizational
redesign.
Third, top management created a sense of urgency to
energize the program, most likely achieved with a









firm’s approach to customers. Managers can manufac-
ture a crisis by painting a scenario in which the firm
is defunct in ten years or by having teams adopt the
role of a predatory competitor. 
Fourth, cultural change followed from behavioral
change. Although culture is always a major impedi-
ment to change, there is no evidence that efforts to
change it first will succeed. Change happens by alter-
ing behavior patterns and helping people understand
how new behavior relates to performance improve-
ment. Eventually, these changes will be absorbed into
the underlying norms, beliefs, and mind-sets.
Finally, the change programs generated useful diag-
nostics on progress through the process, which were
used to encourage learning about success and iden-
tify barriers.
Stages of Change
Successful change programs have six overlapping
stages:7
1. Demonstrating leadership commitment. A leader
owns and champions the change, invests time and
resources, and creates a sense of urgency.
2. Understanding the need for change. Key imple-
menters understand market responsiveness, know the
changes needed, and see the benefits of the change
initiative.
3. Shaping the vision. All employees know what they
are trying to accomplish, understand how to create
superior value, and see what to do differently.
4. Mobilizing commitment at all levels. Those respon-
sible have experience and credibility and know how to
form a coalition of supporters to overcome resistance.
5. Aligning structures, systems, and incentives. Key
implementers have the resources they need to create
a credible plan for alignment. 
6. Reinforcing the change. Those responsible know
how to start the program, keep attention focused on
the change and benchmark measures, and ensure an
early win.
These steps are not sequential. Instead, many stages
initiated early in the program occur simultaneously
(see Figure 1). Each stage interacts with and rein-
forces other stages throughout the process. There is
early emphasis on doing rather than simply studying
what to do.8 An ongoing series of experiments and
early successes creates opportunities for learning and
helps maintain momentum. Frequently, investments
in infrastructure are necessary to carry out the strat-
egy. Fidelity began the development of a data ware-
house at the start of its change program because it
understood that integrating customer information
across the organization was necessary to its strategy
of attracting high-potential customers.
Demonstrating Leadership Commitment
Does the company have a leader who . . .
• Sees the need to change the company’s orientation?
• Is committed to the change process?
• Makes market issues a priority?
• Is willing to invest time and resources?
• Sets aggressive goals for improvement?
• Has established a sense of urgency?
How can top managers signal their commitment and
successfully persuade the entire company that its per-
formance hinges on satisfying target customers better
than competitors do? The answer depends on the
CEO’s style, the magnitude of the change in values
and beliefs, and the past history of change efforts.
The following actions convey the message through-
out the company:
• Enthusiastic emphasis on superior quality of service
and customer relations, with occasional direct inter-
ventions to solve a customer’s problems.
• Visits to customers to listen aggressively to their
viewpoints; an insistence that all senior managers
spend time with customers.
• Emphasis on customer and market issues — trends,
needs, requirements, and opportunities for advantage
— during strategy reviews, supported by a willing-
ness to invest resources in deeply understanding cus-
tomers and competitors.
• Insistence on comparing the company’s perfor-
mance in serving its target customers to that of its
best competitors and then understanding why those
competitors excel.
All these moves signal senior management commit-
ment. But how can a real sense of urgency be
An ongoing series of experiments 
and early successes creates 






infused deep into the organization? One could argue
that the performance problems of Sears Roebuck and
Eurotunnel would have been enough to galvanize
their organizations. There was no need to invent a
crisis — they were living with one. Unfortunately, as
John Kotter observes, this is not enough:
“In most organizations today, the sense of urgency is
much too low. Ironically, this can happen even in an
organization where anxiety and anger are high. It is
amazing how people can maintain a relatively high
degree of complacency while they are either furious
about the way things are going or they’re scared to
death. They think the problems are ‘out there,’ not
within the organization or themselves. Angry or
scared employees aren’t going to try to figure out
how to make major improvements.”9
The CEO at each of the four firms tackled this prob-
lem and created a sense of urgency by setting aggres-
sive targets for improvement. Sears’ Martinez posed
five new strategic priorities — core business growth,
customer focus, cost reduction, responsiveness to
local markets, and organizational and cultural renewal.
He also set difficult goals: within two years, Sears
would quadruple its margins to achieve industry parity,
reverse the share decline, and improve customer sat-
isfaction by 15 percent. At Owens Corning, Glen
Hiner explicitly signaled that raising cash to cut the
debt was no longer the priority: it was time to grow.
In 1993, he wanted the company to grow revenues
from $2.8 billion to $5 billion by 2000 by supplying
everything needed for the “envelope” of the house.
And he vowed that sales outside the United States
would grow from 21 percent to 40 percent, with pro-
ductivity increasing at 6 percent a year and profits
growing twice as fast as sales. Similarly, Eurotunnel
management set ambitious targets for revenue growth
by making the tunnel the preferred choice for all seg-
ments, while also committing to aggressively cutting
costs to address the big operating loss. For Fidelity,
the urgency came from the looming threat of compet-
itive inroads. To continue to prosper, the company
had to earn a much larger share of its customers’
wallets.
It is more difficult to infuse urgency when a business
has been doing well. In 1996, Allied Signal’s Larry
Bossiday explained that the $15 billion defense and
auto parts conglomerate would have to be changed
Figure 1
Overlapping Stages of the Change Program
Understanding need for change
Demonstrating leadership commitment
Initiating the change program Building commitment and understanding Implementing and assessing progress
Planning
Mobilizing commitment
Shaping the vision Refining customer value proposition
Early successes










as much in the next five years as in the previous five
years (a period when the stock quadrupled):
“We have a long way to go in terms of understanding
our customer. I’m asked all the time, ‘What worries
you the most?’ And the predominant worry is, ‘Are
we going to be able to satisfy ever more demanding
customers?’ I was talking to somebody in the food
business the other day. They deliver in ten-minute
windows. In the aerospace industry, you used to
deliver in thirty-day windows. Now it’s overnight. Do
we have the processes — the overnight processes —
to deliver in ten-minute windows? Some of our com-
petitors will have them someday, so we’d better be
prepared. To meet these challenges, a company’s
people have to feel urgency and commitment.”10
Understanding the Need for Change
Do the key implementers . . .
• Understand what it is to be market-driven and
what changes are needed?
• Recognize the barriers to change?
• See how the change program will benefit them and
the business?
Companies have used two approaches to inculcate a
deep understanding of the need for change, always
starting with the customer. Then managers can see
where to reorient the organization and identify priorities.
1. Feedback from Customers. Regardless of how the
customers’ views become part of the process, a com-
pany must observe two rules: First, all members of
the management team — R&D, manufacturing, and
field service — should have first-hand contact with
customers. Until everyone has heard complaints and
frustrations, a sense of urgency will not be pervasive.
Second, to avoid collective delusion, a third party
who is not identified with the sponsoring client
should collect objective information. Managers who
believe their firm excels may refuse to acknowledge
the need for change; customers may abet this belief
by holding back negative information. 
Sears’ customer task force reviewed past survey data
and conducted eighty focus groups for direct feed-
back. The task force asked participants why they
shopped at Sears, what they wanted, what they ex-
pected, and what they disliked. The findings were at
odds with the avowed values, “Satisfaction guaran-
teed or your money back” and “Take care of the cus-
tomer,” which seemed to have lost their meaning.
Instead the task force heard endless stories about
shoppers’ disappointment with out-of-stock merchan-
dise, nonexistent sales help, bad service, and time-
consuming returns.
It is not enough to interview current customers; many
of the best insights come from defectors or attractive
prospects in the target market who have never
shopped or bought anything. Defectors pinpoint
shortcomings and reveal what competitors are doing
to capture customers.
A company should also involve lower-level employees
during this stage. Many sponsor employee workshops
to define customer expectations, reasons for defec-
tion, and opportunities for change. The most energiz-
ing part of the workshops is having multifunctional
teams visit the competitors’ stores, outlets, branches,
or sales points to analyze how they deliver value to
customers and create a different experience. The
teams return with a vivid appreciation of the need for
improvement. These workshops are concrete and
understandable and confront employees with com-
petitive reality.
2. Managers’ Assessment. After confronting reality —
as defined by target customers’ expectations and
competitors’ abilities — the management team can-
didly assesses the company’s progress in creating the
culture, capabilities, structure, and strategy of a 
market-driven organization. Team members normally
disagree on how well their organization is perform-
ing, reflecting different frames of reference, recent
experiences with customers, functional backgrounds,
and organizational level. Too much disparity in their
judgment may dissipate the sense of urgency in a
battle over details. Strong leadership must encourage
an acceptable consensus.
In 1994, Dow Chemical had abundant reasons for
adopting a stronger market orientation: investors
complained about the cyclical performance in com-
modity chemicals, new competitors with lean business
models challenged, and customers indicated that they
had new requirements that Dow wasn’t meeting. The
company gave a standard survey to all managers,11
which had benchmark results for peer companies.
While 65 percent of senior management was positive
about the company’s market orientation, middle man-
agers gave the firm much lower marks (32 percent),
and salaried employees, 24 percent. According to its









companies, with an overall rating in the thirty-second
percentile for all companies in the benchmark survey.
Given the spread in judgments across the levels, it
was clear that some people were out of touch, most
probably the senior managers. The reactions followed
a familiar pattern: confusion at first, then resistance
and denial, including objections to the premise of the
survey, followed by gradual acceptance of the find-
ings and the need for deep-rooted change. The presi-
dent, who brought customers to board meetings and
established multifunctional task forces to lead the
change process, drove the change program.
Shaping the Vision
Do all employees . . .
• Understand how to create superior customer value?
• See what they have to do differently?
• Get excited about the promised results?
In November 1993, Sears’ Martinez asked his change
team how the five strategic priorities announced in
March were progressing. One forthright senior man-
ager stood up and said, “To be perfectly honest, I
don’t know what I’m supposed to be doing different-
ly.” It became clear that top management’s strategic
priorities weren’t meaningful to the rest of the organi-
zation. The problem was that the five priorities
lacked broad ownership and employee engagement.
An organization’s members do best when there is a
clear connection between the strategy for delivering
superior customer value and the members’ individual
contributions. Each of the four companies worked
hard to convey the larger picture to their employees
and enable them to develop a vision and strategy
that supported the overall effort.
A coalescing vision for Owens Corning was “system
thinking,” which pushed the notion that roofing,
exteriors, insulation, and sound absorption are all
systems that work together to solve customers’ prob-
lems. If buyers knew how shingles, vents, insulation,
and soffits worked together to make a better roof, if
they could pick a reliable contractor, if contractors
could provide financing, and if Owens Corning pro-
vided all the information, it could sell more Owens
Corning products. Under this type of umbrella, prod-
uct developers have clear priorities, merchandising
and advertising are easier to target, relationships with
contractors are closer, and systems provide the inte-
grating information.
Early in the change process, Sears managers articulated
a vision of a “compelling place to work, to shop, to
invest,” which was then combined with three slogans:
“passion for the customer,” “our people add value,”
and “performance leadership.” As a guiding vision, it
was simple and to the point. It also fell on deaf ears,
for the line employees had completely different
mind-sets. When a large sample of employees was
asked what they were paid to do every day, the
answer was most likely, “I get paid to protect the
assets of the company.” In short, they completely
misunderstood their role. But how could managers
shift the mind-sets toward making Sears a compelling
place to shop?
To help employees understand their proper role in
the bigger picture, Sears managers prepared learning
maps, which teams of employees discussed at “town
hall meetings.”12 (A learning map is a large picture of
a town, store, or river that leads participants through
a business or historical process.) One map portrayed
the shifts in the retail environment and the prolifera-
tion of competitors between 1950 and 1990. Another
map analyzed the sources and uses of funds as they
flowed from the cash register to the bottom line.
Sears managers then asked the teams to apply what
they had learned and recommend actions they could
take immediately at their store, warehouse, or office
to improve customer service or simplify their activi-
ties. The strong signal was that front-line employees
would have more autonomy to do right by the cus-
tomer — and help Sears win in an increasingly com-
petitive retail market.
Eurotunnel management also used a team approach
to overcome their employees’ suspicions that the
change program was mainly concerned with cutting
costs and get them to focus on their contributions to
improving operations and satisfying customers. At the
peak of the change activity, almost one-third of the
3,000 employees were participating in one of eighty-
An organization’s members do best 
when there is a clear connection
between the strategy for delivering 
superior customer value and the 
members’ individual contributions.
seven multifunctional teams. Many of the teams that
addressed the needs of a customer segment included
a particular type of customer, such as a truck owner.
The teams had latitude in their activities but were
held accountable for delivering a set of benefits. The
mobilizing vision was to make Eurotunnel the natural
choice for crossing the channel. Each team had a
defined role in supporting the vision. The vision and
all the connecting elements of processes, systems,
and roles were communicated in dozens of meetings,
newsletters, and a large wall chart that showed each
team’s position.
Mobilizing Commitment
Do the sponsors of the change . . . 
• Have experience and credibility?
• Recognize who else needs to be committed to
making the change happen?
• Know how to rally a coalition of supporters and
overcome expected resistance?
• Have needed resources?
Companies need an effective management team to
mobilize commitment for change efforts. This team
can be drawn together from mavericks inside the firm
or — often more effective in a crisis situation — from
outsiders with fresh perspectives. Wherever the mem-
bers come from, the organization needs to establish a
team with the experience and credibility to mobilize
the entire organization.
A popular but generally ineffectual method for instill-
ing a market orientation is to create a council or
steering group. Firms that think they should do some-
thing but aren’t quite ready for deep-seated change
often resort to these. Commonly, their charter is to
elevate skills, share best practices, or understand what
it means to be market-driven. As they are implement-
ed in many organizations, these groups have little
chance of success. With as many as thirty or forty
people and shifting membership, they are too large
for real work and have little continuity. Meetings are
carefully orchestrated set-pieces with outside speak-
ers but no mandate for serious follow-up action.
Resources are usually limited — perhaps a staff per-
son and a modest budget — and members’ time
commitment is very limited.
Some companies succeed in overcoming these obsta-
cles. When Monsanto created a council to drive the
company toward a “best of class” market orientation,
it established a small leadership team of ten vice
presidents and general managers that had a mandate
to change basic behaviors, build market-driven capa-
bilities, and transfer best practices. The team was
expected to spend at least 30 percent of its time on
this effort and agreed to partially tie compensation to
the results. The council had all the resources it need-
ed, including a full-time “director of marketing core
capability.” It met at least two times a week and
focused on only a few big issues — such as relation-
ship management — that would have the greatest
leverage in changing a culture that was very 
technology-driven.
A company in as deep a hole as Sears or Owens
Corning needs more drastic measures. No amount of
councils, consultants, and conferences will yield fun-
damental, durable change. For a serious effort, a new
management team is needed, because the old one is
likely short of credibility, energy, and imagination.
Sometimes the right people are in the organization
but difficult to identify. Often they have the right
instincts and probably agitate for change but are frus-
trated in their crusade. They have the advantage of
knowing the prevailing culture. But can they escape
its deeply embedded values and assumptions to envi-
sion a more open, externally oriented culture, and
then orchestrate a change effort? Sometimes the agita-
tors for change lack credibility and respect because
they have been operating at the periphery of the
organization; they should act as consultants but not
lead the change initiative.
Martinez was able to change Sears because most new
appointees on the senior executive team had no
experience in retailing. The executive vice president
in charge of logistics was a three-star general who
masterminded the Gulf War supply chain. The head
of marketing had extensive experience in brand man-
agement with Pepsi and Procter & Gamble and saw
that Sears’ strong brands had much more potential for
building loyalty than the company appreciated.
Unfortunately, organizations often treat outsiders like





A popular but generally ineffectual
method for instilling a market orientation
is to create a council or steering group.
larly common fate of successful marketing people who
have been brought in from powerhouse marketing
companies like Procter & Gamble, American Express,
or Coke to lead the change effort in an established
firm in a very different industry — perhaps one that
is deregulating like banking or telecommunications.
They face two problems at the outset; they don’t
understand the technology, customer requirements,
or key success factors in the new business, and they
are separated from most of the support systems and
cultural reinforcement that had made them successful.
When disenchantment sets in, these victims lose even
the top-level support they once had. 
By this stage in the change program, enthusiasm
should be high and the commitment of the top offi-
cers unquestioned. Ideally, early success has quieted
the skeptics and clarified the intent and benefits of a
market orientation. But what if results don’t come as
quickly as expected, murmurs of doubt are heard,
and pockets of passive resistance are uncovered? This
fragile stage has many potential obstacles to over-
come.13 The most common obstacles, identified in
surveys of managers and post-audits of failed efforts,
are listed in the sidebar. 
Aligning Structures, Systems, and Incentives
Is there a credible plan for . . .
• Modifying the organization structure and systems?
• Recruiting, developing, and deploying people in
the new structure?
• Developing capabilities to sense markets and relate
to them?
• Changing the systems?
• Encouraging and rewarding market-driven behavior?
Once the change initiative is under way, a company
turns its attention to institutionalizing it so the com-
pany doesn’t revert to its old ways. How can the
company encourage and reward sustained market-
driven behavior? The three most effective levers are
organizational and process redesign, systems support,
and incentives and rewards.
Organizational and Process Redesign. Many firms
have adopted hybrid organizational structures, with
teams focused on managing distinct customer and
consumer segment groups, for achieving closer align-
ment.14 Each group that deals with customers must
create a credible superior value proposition for its
segment. Eurotunnel used this lever to uncover the
distinct needs of tourist travelers and business travel-
ers as well as truck drivers and international trains.
Fidelity shifted responsibility for profits and customer
retention from product managers to market segment
managers. Then product managers worked on new
product and system developments that required deep
technical expertise.
Crucial to an organizational redesign is reengineering





Persistent Obstacles to Change
Program Success
• Absence of leadership. If the presump-
tive leaders lack credibility or credentials,
demand politically acceptable solutions, or
can’t bring the rest of the management
team to consensus, the whole effort is like-
ly to be futile.
• Initiative burnout. Weariness settles on
organizations that have been forced to
change more or less continuously as strate-
gic priorities change. Some managers may
have experienced five or six widely herald-
ed change initiatives during their time with
the company, each promising salvation and
each soon supplemented by yet another ini-
tiative. This bewildering mix of approaches
with distinct methods, vocabularies, deliv-
erables, and teams of outside consultants
competes for a shrinking share of the orga-
nizational mind.
• Stifling cultures. Cultures in which
managers and employees are suspicious of
new ideas can quickly derail a change
process. Often the rules of conduct and
practice behind a firm’s earlier success are
codified into rigid operating standards and
styles. More subtle resistance arises when
employees or middle managers think they
are doing well and regard the new program
as an implicit criticism of their efforts.
• Management turmoil. Many initiatives
have stalled or failed during turmoil in man-
agerial ranks. The champion is gone, and
the new team has not accepted the initia-
tive or wants to do something different. If
there is a lot of turnover at the top, no one
can remember why various initiatives were
started, and the company becomes progres-
sively more confused and disenchanted.
• Lack of urgency. If managers and
employees don’t feel change is urgently
needed, other more pressing concerns (such
as immediate sales results) will push it
aside. Some people may feel that they’re
too busy and can’t possibly spare the time.
Others may protest that they’re already
doing it or that it’s a waste of money. If the
company is already successful, people may
feel that they know the customers and com-
petitors well enough.
• Poor implementation. Implementation
problems range from lack of resources or
time to employees not clearly understand-
ing the benefits and goals. It is also hard to
sustain enthusiasm without early success





and realigning them with supporting processes such
as human resources. This is reengineering in the
proper sense of optimizing a sequence of activities.15
In 1994 and 1995, IBM revamped its customer rela-
tionship management (CRM) processes. It began with
a clear set of customer requirements, i.e., “understand
me and my business. . . keep your promises . . . do
business on my terms,” that were translated into
objectives for each of the ten supporting processes
such as opportunity management, customer satisfac-
tion management, and market management.16 The
pivotal process was market management based on
the familiar sequence of analyzing markets, identify-
ing and selecting segments, and devising strategies
for each segment. The output of this tidy process fed
all the other processes — and that’s where the trou-
ble started. For example, if IBM identified a new tar-
get segment, it had difficulty getting the human
resources and training departments to pay attention,
but, without their contribution, the right skills weren’t
available. The sales force was particularly resistant to
changing its day-to-day activities. Its mind-set was
that all business is good, that all sales opportunities
are good, and that all revenue is good. This clashed
directly with the emphasis on attractive opportunities
in a market-relating capability rather than diffusing
energies across high and low priorities.
Incentives and Rewards. The best intentions of a
market-driven change program will be thwarted if the
compensation plan comes from another era. IBM
people thought all revenue was good revenue; that
was how IBM compensated them. The research here
is unequivocal.17 If the change effort is to be taken
seriously, the rewards and incentives have to be
aligned. Sears bases long-term executive compensa-
tion on nonfinancial as well as financial performance
— one-third on employee measures, one-third on
customer satisfaction and retention measures, and
one-third on traditional investor measures. Since this
is such a powerful signal and motivator, it has been
extended to nearly all field managers, whose annual
incentive is now based on targeted improvements in
customer satisfaction. Even hourly associates can earn
variable incentive pay based on improved customer
satisfaction.
Systems. It is impractical to focus an organization on
the customers with the greatest life-time value or the
most profitable segments or presume to offer seam-
less service with a hodgepodge of mismatched legacy
systems. This is why some of the biggest break-
throughs come from systems projects, and also why
they are among the last steps in the process.
A centerpiece of the change process at Owens Corning
was the realignment of systems to support its new
strategy. Customers would enter the Owens Corning
system to find available inventory, determine their
order-shipping date, and pay electronically, so that
the multiplicity of products became a coherent bun-
dle. Owens Corning replaced all systems with SAP,
the powerful, notoriously difficult enterprise software.
But old systems and procedures couldn’t simply be
replicated on the new systems; they all had to be
completely redesigned to mesh with the new process-
es that flowed information rather than leaving it in
separate silos. After paying $110 million to install SAP
and train people, the company expects to save as
much as $80 million annually by 2000. More impor-
tant, it has aligned and integrated external informa-
tion flows and internal processes and information.
Systems changes are closely associated with process
redesign. Fidelity changed its approach to customer
development and retention with a new process that
enabled it to evolve from multiple service platforms
(that couldn’t share customer data) to a single plat-
form. It changed its standard service for all customers
to segmented service (for example, calls routed to
representatives depending on the attractiveness of the
caller). And it changed from product cross-selling to
relationship development by targeting high potential
customers.
Reinforcing the Change
Do those responsible for change . . .
• Know how to get started and ensure early success?
• Have benchmarks for measuring progress?
• Have a plan to focus attention on the change pro-
gram?
Companies beset with day-to-day internal concerns
often backslide after their initial success at becoming
more market-driven. Managers need to sustain the
The best intentions of a market-driven
change program will be thwarted 






change process and drive the organization to higher
levels of market orientation in a process called
“painting the bridge” (as the painters of large bridges 
who finish their job at one end immediately start
over). They need to continuously disseminate best
practices, measure and assess progress (and assess
the metrics used for measuring), and focus attention
on the process.18
Companies need to turn episodic efforts at improve-
ment into a discipline embedded in the culture. Most
successful change initiatives begin with an early, visi-
ble win that the company can celebrate and use as
an example.19 Eurotunnel pushed hard in the early
stages of the change program to launch a club class
for business travelers, which showed the benefits of
working in multifunctional teams. Pilot programs can
also be used to fine-tune the change program and
build enthusiasm.
The development of these wins, and the dissemination
of the best practices created by them, needs to be
ongoing. Wal-Mart has mastered the rapid diffusion of
best practices and winning programs to all stores.
During its regular Saturday morning merchandising
meetings, the company celebrates managers’ out-
standing achievements. A department manager in one
store with a very effective approach might communi-
cate her strategy to managers throughout the organi-
zation via satellite. The managers can then immedi-
ately implement this best practice in their own stores.
A sustained effort requires ongoing monitoring of per-
formance against objectives for improvement in impor-
tant market metrics. When Xerox launched its customer
satisfaction program in 1990, it set a target of 90 percent
ratings of “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” by
1992.20 As it got closer to that goal, it raised the bar.
Then it changed the target measure to customer reten-
tion, which reenergized the program. Whatever measure
is used, it should be closely linked to financial perfor-
mance, easily understood, and reliably measured so
people have confidence in the results.
Overall, managers need to focus attention on the
change process to sustain it. In addition to dissemi-
nating best practices and using measures, companies
use continuous benchmarking against competition,
frequent inputs from customers, and constant ques-
tioning of all processes to reinforce the effort to
become market-driven.
Conclusion
The stories of Fidelity Investments, Sears, Eurotunnel,
and Owens Corning describe the unique path every
organization follows to becoming more market-
driven, shaped by its own past and competitive posi-
tion. While some companies are able to successfully
design change programs, many others remain aspi-
rants. They believe that marginal changes, a few
management workshops, and proclamations of good
intentions suffice when they should be mounting a
fundamental change in their culture, capabilities,
organization, and systems.
The program to create a market-driven organization
must begin quickly but be sustained over many
years. Fidelity Investments’ program took five years
to approach 60 percent completion. Fidelity’s
patience was rewarded with a large increase in cus-
tomer-retention rates and a doubling in “share of wal-
let” within the first five years. Results like this both
justify the effort and sustain the change program.
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